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ABSTRACT 
Empirical  experience  and theory both suggest  that policy  reforms  con  he 
aborted  or reversed  if they lack sufficient  credibility.  One reason  for such 
credibility  problems  is the legitimate  doubt  regarding  how serious  the 
government  really  is about  the reform  process.  This  paper  considers  a 
framework  in which the private  sactor  is unable to distinguish between a 
genuinely  reformist  governmant  and its nemesis,  a government  which  simply 
feigns  interest  in reform  because  it is a precondition  for foreign assistance, 
The general  conclusion  is that the rate t  which  reforms  are introduced  any 
serve to convey  the government's  future  intentions,  and hence  act as a signal 
of  its  "type".  More specifically,  credible  policy reform  may require  going 
overboard:  the government  will have to go much  farther  than it would  have 
chosen  to in  the absence  of  the credibility  problem. 
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I.  Introduction 
A  government  initiates a series of  important  reforms,  including  trade and 
financial  liberalization  and disinflation policies.  But the private  aector 
(and poaaibly  foreign creditors)  do  not fully believe  that the reforms will 
peraiat.  Should  the government  attempt to enhance its credibility?  How can 
it do ao?  What  are the consequences  for the economy and the reform  process  if 
it is unable  to? 
Experience  and theory both suggest that lack of credibility can be very 
coatly  indeed.  For an  important  example, conaider  orthodox  policiea of 
disinflation  that  rely  on  sharp  reductions  in  monetary  growth.  Unlesa  the 
private sector  remaina fully  convinced that  the monetary  contrection  will 
continue,  the result  may  well be  wages and  prices  sut t  tuo high  a level 
relative  to the future  stock  of monetary  aggregates  The consequent  reduction 
in  real liquidity  will then exert  strong recessionary  litres.  A conceptually 
similar outcome  obtaina in  the case of trade-  liberalizing  reforms lacking 
credibility.  When a future  reversal of  the liberalization  is anticipated,  the 
private aector  will tend to over-borrow from  abroad, running  "too large" a 
deficit on the current  account  (Calvo, 1986; see also van Wijnbergen,  1985). 
In both  caaea,  the adverse consequences  of the lack of  credibility  could be 
serioua enough  to force even  the best-intentioned  government  to abort the 
reform proceaa,  thereby validating  the suspicions  of the private sector. 
More  generally,  as  Calvo  (1986) has pointed out, lack  of  credibility  ia 
functionally  equivalent  to a distortion  in the structure  of intertemporal 
relative pricea:  economic  agenta baae their actions on  pricea  which differ -2- 
from  those that  will materielize  if the refotm  is carried  out to fruition. 
The presence  of  this distortion  in turn  otestes e second-best  environment, 
with all the ususl  second-best  complications.  Hence  the reform  itself, while 
beneficial  on its owrt,  may lead  to losses in  overall welfare if  perceived  as 
lacking sufficient  credibility.  Similarly,  there may he a second-best  role 
for introducing  additional  distortions  in  the economy  to the extent  that these 
either  offset  the distortions  associated  with  the problem  or  enhance  the 
government  s credibility. 
Deterrining  the appropriate policy stance in such a context requires 
knowledgs  of the sources  of the credibility gap.  The  question  is:  why would 
the public  fear that  the policy reforms will be reversed dssfljqf  the 
governmenc'a  assurances  to  the  contrary?  Answers to this  question based on 
rational behavior fall under three broad categories,1 
First,  the government's  reforma may  be inconsistent  with  other  polities 
being  pursued simultaneously,  and be  recognized  as auth by the puhlic. 
Examplea of auth situations  abound.  Trade  reform  in the presents  of pegged 
exchange rates  (with prices  sticky downwards)  will  not be  viable,  as the 
thilean  case has demonstrated.  Similarly, disinflationary  policies which  do 
not concurrently  tackle  the public-sector budget  deficit will lank 
credibility,  irrespective  of  whether orthodox or  heterodox  measurss  are 
utilized.  The establishment  of "target zones"  for major  currencies  will  not 
1,  Salvo  (1986, pp. 27-29)  suggests an  additional  explanation not considered 
here,  namely  that policy  announcements  can never be as complete  ma the 
complications  of  the economy dictate,  and hence must  almost  always  auffer  from 
an inherent  lack of credibility.  I exclude this consideration  hers because it 
seems  to me to be of  second-order  importance compared  to the others to be 
discussed. -3- 
be a solution  to exchange-rate  volatility  unless  the governments  concerned 
undertake  the requisite monetary-fiscal  policy  combinations  to maintain  their 
exchange  rates within  the appropriate  bands.  In all these cases, policy 
reform  does not pass the credibility  test because  the public  understands  that 
it  violates budget  constrainta  or  accounting  identities. 
Secondly,  there might  be a genuine time-inconsistency  problem  for the 
government:  its optimal ex-post strategy may differ  from its optimal ex-ante 
strategy.  For example, once  the private sector  sets wages  and prices,  the 
authorities  may find  it tempting to disinflate  less  than they had promised  in 
order to  get some output  gains  (Barro and Cordon,  1983).  Similar temptations 
to "surprise"  the private  sector may exist with trade policy  as well (see 
Staiger and Tabellini,  1987).  In circumstances  where  the authorities have an 
ex-post  incentive  to  renege on their promises,  it is of  course  perfectiy 
rational for private agents to  discount  announcements  of future policy 
reforms--or  assurances  of the continuation  of  present reforms.  Potential 
solutions  to  the time-inconsiatency  problem can  be found  in  commitments  and 
reputation-building,  neither  of  which, however, will do the job costleasly. 
Commitments have the disadvantage  of  tying the government's  hands against 
unforeseen  contingencies  in which  freedom of  action would  have  been  desirable 
cx ante (see Rodrik  and Zeckhauser,  1987).  Reputations  can be  built  only  by 
using up valuable  time. 
The final  source of  credibility  problems  is incomplete  or asymmetric 
information: private  agents may not be able to tell how serious  the government 
really  is about  the reform process.  In  other words,  they may be in the dark 
about  the true objectives  of  the government  in  power, or may "confuse" it  with 
an alternative  government  whose objectives  differ.  Imperfect  information of -4- 
this sott is likely  to he  particulsrly  prevslent  in countries  where 
governments  (and finance ministers)  rotate  rapidly, and in developing 
countries  in  particular.  Notice  that this is radically  different  from  the 
time-  inconsistency  case  above where  the private  sector understands  the 
government's motivations  only  too well.  The resolution  of  the credibility 
problem  in such  instances  will  requite the government  to "signal" its true 
type.  Whether  this is good  policy  or not will in turn depend  on the cost  of 
investing  in  the appropriate  signal. 
The present paper is concerned with this lest type of  ccedibility 
problem.  The framework  I will  consider  is one in which the private sector  is 
unable  to distinguish between  a govemnment  intent on  trade reform  end one 
which  simply  feigns  interest in  reform because  this is a precondition  for 
direly needed  foreign aid.  The general message  that  will  come  acroee  is that 
the rate at  which  the reform  is introduced  may serve  to convey  the 
government's  future  intentions, and  hence  act as a signal  of ita "type".  Note 
specifically,  credible policy  reform will requite going overboard:  the 
govetnment  will have to go  much  further than it would have chosen to in  the 
absence of the credibility problem.  In the case  considered here,  the reform- 
minded  government  will buy credibility by not only eliminating  protection, but 
actually  subsidizins  imports  (exports)  .  This provides  a solution  to the 
credibility  problem  in that  the reformist  government's  nemesis would  never 
find it advantageous  to go as far.  Signaling  in  this faahion  is of  course 
costly,  and its ultimate  desirability will  depend  on a number  of factors. 
But, and this is  the key  point,  achieving  credibility  will  always  require a 
igrggr  policy  reform  than  would  have  been  dictated  in  the absence of the 
credibility  problem.2 -5- 
The model  to be analyzed  below  contraata  the behavior  of a "libetalizing" 
government  with that  of a "rediatributive"  government.  The former valuea 
trade  reform because  of  the uaual  allocative  efficiency  gains  to derived 
therefrom,  and intends to atick with  the liberalization.  The latter uaea 
tariff  revenues  to redistribute  income to  favored groups in  society,  end, due 
to  the absence of  alternative  policies,  prefers some protection  to  none.  I 
sssume, as is usually  the case,  that trade liberalization  is  supported  by 
foreign assistance  from  mulrilsrersl  institutions, with the aid conditional  on 
rhe launching  of the reform.  This is a crucial part  of the story.  Since 
foreign assistance  may well provide a motive  for the "redistributive' 
government  to mimic  the "liberalizer"  for awhile,  the puhlic csnnot  be 
entirely  sure in the initial stages of  the reform ss to which  sort  of 
government  it faces.  Consequently,  governmentsl  assursnces  thst the reform 
will not be reversed  in  the future  are taken with  a reasonable  grain  of salt. 
Notice that foreign aid results  in s hidden  cost: by  skewing  the incentives  of 
the "redistributive"  government,  it makes  it  more difficult  for the 
liberalizing"  government  to reveal  its true iype. 
The outline of the paper  is as follows,  Section TI lays out the basic 
2.  This conclusion  is consistent  with  the apparent  empirical  regularity  that 
trade reforms are more likely  to be successful when they  are undertaken 
wholesale  and in such a wey as to  create  a major break  with the past.  A 
recent  review  of 37 liberalization  episodes in  19 tountries  concludes  that 
"the likelihood  of  survival  of  a liberelization  atterpt  is substantially 
higher  where  the initial policy  measures undertsken  are major  and significant: 
halting  or hesitating  policy  sctions leading to s very  gradual liberalization 
are much  more likely  to cause a collapse.  This is  particularly  true in 
instances of countries  (characteristic  of  most of  Latin America)  in which  the 
history  restrictions  on  trade  is long and pervasive"  (Papageorgiou,  Michaely 
and Choksi,  1986).  The authors conjecture  that this sight be partly  due to 
reasons having  to do with  crsdibility. -6- 
model  and discusses  the costs engendeced by the lack  of  ccadibility.  In  our 
case,  the costs  are roflected  in  sub-optimal  levels of investment,  aa private 
savings fall in anticipation of higher  prices  for imported  goods in the 
future.  In section III,  the sources of the credibility  problea ace examined 
by introducing  a "redistributive"  government with an  objective  function  that 
differs  fcom  that  of the "liberalizer".  Section  IV analyzes  the circumstances 
under  which  "separating"  and "pooling" equilibria  will occur,  and discusses 
the likely benefits  (and costs) of  achieving credibility  for the 
"liberalizing"  government  via signaling  that leads to "separation". 
Concluding  observations  are offered  in section V. 
II. The Costs of Lsck  of  Credibility 
We start with  a stylized model  of an  economy  that allows  a relatively 
straightforward  analysis of credibility  issues.  To focus on the new issues, 
we will abstract  from many real-world  aspects.  In particular,  the assumption 
will  be that the domestic  economy produces a single good  which is not consumed 
at  home,  and that  all consumption  and investment  goods are imported.  To 
incorporate  the dynamic considerations  raised  above, we will look  at  a two- 
period  model.  Since trade  reform will typically  take place under  conditions 
of either  capital-account  restrictions  or credit  rationing  abroad, capital 
flows will  be assumed  to be non-existent  save for the possibility  of foreign 
aid.  The domestic economy  is taken to  be small  in  world  markets,  and all 
world  prices will  be fixed at unity  by an  appropriate  choice of  units. 
Let f(k,  .2)  and  F(k+i,  .2)  be  the production  functions  for domestic  output 
in the first and second  period,  respectively,  and i be first-period 
investment.  (Given  the two-period  horizon,  there will  be no investment  in the -7- 
second  period.)  The economy's  fixed  and fully-employed  initial  endowments  of 
capital  and labor are denoted  by k and 1.  The level of  investment  in the 
economy  is determined  by maximizing  the present discounted  value  of net 
benefits  of investment: 
max  (SF(k+i, .2) 
-  i], 
1. 
where  S is the domestic discount  factor  (one over  one plus the nominal 
interest rate).  I  will  assume  throughout  that imports of investment  goods  are 
not subject  to tariffs, so that the domestic and  world  prices of investment 
goods are identical  and fixed at unity.  Notice  that since all producer  prices 
are fixed (and independent of tariffs),  changes in  & will correspond  directly 
to changes  in  the  j. interest  rate relevant  to investment decisions. 
Solving the above maximization  problem yields 
(I)  &F1(k+i,  .2) 
-  1  0, 
where  the  numbered  subscript  denotes a partial  derivative with respect to the 
relevsnt  variable.  This  defines an implicit investment  function  of  the form 
i  i(S), with 
di/d&  i'(.) — -F1/(&F11) > 0, 
since the production  function  is concave in  N.  Desired investment  rises  mm 
the discount  factor increases  (or the interest  rate falls)  since future  gains 
in output  become more  valued  relative  to  present consumption. 
Consumers  are represented  by a two-period expenditure  function  E(l+t, 
&(l+T), IJ),  where  W denotes welfare,  and t and  T denote  first- and second- -8- 
period  tariffs,  resperrively.  This  function  gives  the present discounted 
value of expenditures  required  to achieve welfere  level P when  first-  and 
second-period  prices are l+t  and  LeT.  Notice that the  second-period price is 
discounted by 8,  and  that  the  discount  factor  for  consurers is  given  by 
q  8(l±T)/(l-4-t). 
The consumption rate of interest is  in  turn  a  negative  function of q,  and  can 
be  expressed  as (l/qi 
- I),  This interteaporal  relative price will  play a 
cruciel  role throughout  the analysis,  as it is  the chief  detorrinant of 
savings behavior. 
The levels of consumption  in the two periods  can be  derived by taking  the 
appropriate  partial derivatives  of  the expenditure  funcrioc: 
(2)  c  E1(.)  (first-period  consumption), 
(3)  C  E2C)  (second-period  consumption). 
Since all consumption goods  are  imported,  a tariff is here  equival  ent  to an 
economy-wide  consumption tax.  And since tariff revenue will he  redistributed 
in lump-sumfashion  back to  the private  sector, tariffs will  not  give rise  to 
their usual static efficiency costs in the  present  framework.  As  the costs of 
protection  are well known,  little harm  is  done in abstracting from them in 
order to concentrate  on  intertemporsl  sources of  welfare  losses  arising purely 
from credibility problems.  Of course,  in the  absence  of static  efficiency 
coats,  the "liberalizing"  government would  have formally no reason  to remove 
protection.  Keeping such costs  in the  background, we  will  assume  that it will 
want to pursue  trade reform nonetheless. 
Equilibrium  in the  economy requires intertemporal equality  between -9- 
aggregate  income  (net of  investment  spending>  and consumption  expenditures: 
(4)  E(.) — 
where  Y represents  the present discounted  value  of  net income: 
(5)  Y  — f(k,2)  - i + tc + B + 8[F(k+i,2)  + TGJ. 
First-period  income consists  of production  revenues  net of  investment 
expenditures  plus tariff  revenue  a foreign  transfer of amount  B  which is 
contingent  on first-period  trade reform.  Notice  that foreign assistance  is 
taken to  come in the form  of a grant rather  than  a loan (i.e. it is not paid 
back>;  this  is to simplify  the algebra only  and  will not affect  the 
qualitative  results.  Second-period  income in  turn consists  of second-period 
production  and tariff revenues. 
Since  foreign borrowing/lending  is ruled  out, equilibrium also requires 
equality between  income  and expenditure  in each period  separately.  Given (4), 
one of  these  two conditions  is redundant  and  we choose  to express the first- 
period  constraint  only: 
(6)  (l+t)c = f(k,.2)  -  i + tc + S. 
This equates first-period  domestic  savings to investment  expenditures. 
Equations  (4) and (6) together will  determine  the welfare  level W and the 
discount factor  &  (or the interest rate). 
Now consider  a trade reform,  The government  reduces t to zero  and 
promises  that in the second  period  T will  be zero as well.  This  clears  the 
way for foreign  aid.  But suppose that  the public does  not believe  that the 
reform will  be maintained.  The underlying  determinants  of this lack of -10- 
credibility  will  be discussed  later.  For the moment, assume rbat  consumers 
are risk-neutral,  and char they act in the certainty  that the future  level of 
tsriffs will  be given  by t > 0.  We will  first  treat T parametrically,  and 
then  endogenire  it in  the sections  to  come. 
What are the consequences  of the lack of credibility?  The anticipation 
that tariffs will increase in  the future  reduces the real  consumption  rate of 
interest  (raises the reel consumption  discount factor)  and hence  depresses 
first-period  savings.  In  response,  investment  has to  fell, and welfare  is 
reduced  due to a sub-optimal  level  of  investment. 
T.o  see these effect  at work,  we  analyze  the comparative  statics  of  the 
model (with r=0),  Differentiating  (4) end (6)  end making  the appropriate 
substitutions,  we first express  the response  of  the reel discount  factor  (q) 
to changes  in t: 
(?)  0 < dq/dt — (S/[l±]) < 6, 
where 
({l+t/i'] N6E22(l  t(SE2w/[E1w + EE2w]flì  >0. 
The various  cross-derivatives  of  the expenditure  function are signed  me 
follows:  is non-positive  due to The negative  semi-definiteness  of the 
substitution  matrix,  end  end  ere positive  under  the essumption  thet 
present  end future  goods era both  "normal" with  positive  income  elasticities 
of demand.  Notice  that  q increases with t,  hut that the effect  is dsmpened 
due to a reduction  in  5.  (In the absence of changes in  6, dq/dt  would have 
equalled  6,)  That is,  S  8(t) with dS/dt < 0.  The welfare level,  in  turn, 
is directly  related to the consumption  rate of  interest: -11- 
(8)  dW  (l/O)61E22  dq, 
where 9  a (E 
-  stE2w) > 0  (see  Dixit  snd  Normsn,  1980,  p.  187).  Hence 
(9)  dW/dt —  s 0. 
This expression  is unambigiously  negstive whenever  evaluated  st sn initially 
positive  level of  t.  But  when the credibility  problem  is "small",  the 
associated  welfare  losses  are of second order  of  importance.  An explicit 
expression  for the welfare  losses  associated  with  the lack  of  credibility  can 
he found via a first-order  Taylor approximation.3  Letting  Ak a W(t) 
-  W(0) 
represent  the difference  between the welfare  levels  resulting  under  imperfect 
and full credibility,  respectively: 
(10)  AW  (52/9[l+])E22t2  C 0. 
Notice  that the cost is proportional  to  the square of the anticipated  tariff, 
and is larger  the stronger  is intertemporal  substitutability  in consumption 
(represented by 
The welfare  costa of imperfect credibility  arise  from  the intertemporal 
distortion  introduced  by anticipations  of future  tariffs.  The consumption 
rate of interest  is reduced  artificially,  resulting  in  sub-optimal  levels  of 
saving  and investment  in the economy.  In the present  framework,  consumers  and 
3.  I.e., W(0)  A  W(t) + (dW/dT)[0 - tJ,  where  dW/dT  is evaluated  at t. 
4.  We could also think of (10) as an  approximation  using  the mean  value 
theorem,  in which  case  all the derivatives on the right-hand  side have  to be 
evaluated  at an intermediate point  between 0 and t. -12- 
producers  make jl  of rheir decisions  in rhe iirst period;  the second  period's 
consumption  level is entirely  determined by previous  investment  snd saving 
decisions.  Consequently,  no  changes  in consumption or investment  behavior  are 
possible when the government's  true intentions  are revealed  in  the second 
period.  The economy  suffers from  an  anticipated but unrealized  reversal  in 
the trade reform  in  exactly  the same way that it would  from  an actual 
reversal.0  Lack  of  credibility  is functionally  equivalent  to unsuccessful 
reform. 
Notice in addition  that no time-inconsistency  problems  arise  for the 
"liberalizing"  government.  Once the second  period  comes  around,  the 
government's  best strategy remains to follow its original  promise  of zero 
tariffs,  irrespective  of the anticipations  harbored  by the public. 
For later reference,  it  will also be useful  to perform  the comparative 
statics of the system  with  respect to  changes  in  the foreign transfer,  B. 
Differentiating  (4) and (6)  once again  (with tC)  ,  we  are  left  with: 





iE1w  (E12±di/dS)  [dg  Ldgj 
The determinant  (Det) can be shown to be positive,  so we have (after 
simplifying by using  the homogeneity  properties  of E(.fl: 
dW/dB  (l/Det){(di/d&) 
- 
SE22]  > 0,  and 
B.  In  a richer model,  the private sector would  normally heve the ability to 
adjust  some of  its behavior  once the expectations upon which  it acted  is 
proved  wrong.  This would then drive a wedge between  the ex-ante and ex-post 
levels of  welfare.  For an  interesting  analysis  of such issues in  a different 
context  see Persson and Svensson  (1983).  See also below. -13- 
d5/dB  (l/Det)&E2  > . 
Notice that an increase  in  the transfer raises  the discount  factor and 
therefore  stimulates  investment.  The effect  comes about  as the increase  in 
first-period  income  leads to a less than  equal  increase  in desired first- 
period  consumption. 
III.  The "Redistributive"  Government 
The discussion  above has taken for granted the existence of a credibility 
problem  for the government  (as in  Calvo,  1986, and Froot, nd.).  In order  to 
partially  endogenize  credibility  it  is convenient  to conceptualize  the problem 
as arising from  an inability on the part of  the public  to identify  the true 
motives  of  the government  in power,  Why should  the new regime's promises  be 
any more credible  than  the previous  regime's?  The development  process is 
littered with  half-hearted  reforms, and the public  eventually  learns: pjg 
pa change, plus p'est  la meme chose.  Absent  significant  signs  to  the 
contrary,  the public  will generally be safe in  discounting  promises of lasting 
reform. 
This sort of  situation  can be modelled  by assuming  that the private 
sector maximizes  its expected  utility given its prior beliefs regarding  the 
likelihood  that the reform will  be aborted.  Let TR denote  the value  of  the 
tariff that  will  obtain  if the reform  is reversed,  and it  be  the prior 
probability  attached  to the reform being  maintained.  The expected value  of 
the second-period  tariff, denoted exp(T), can be written  as follows: 
exp(T) =  (lit).TR. -14- 
When the public  is unable  to tell the "type" of  the government  in place, a 
will  be generally  indeterminate  and will  depend  on  history  and ether 
characteristics  of society; I will  therefore  treat  it as exogenously  given. 
In  a "separating"  equilibrium,  on the other hand,  a will  be known  to be either 
zero or unity.  In this sense, a is a direct measure  of the credibility  of 
reform. 
We define  the "certainty-equivalent"  level of  the second-period  tariff as 
that level which, if known  with certainty, would  make consumers  behave  in 
exactly the same fashion as in  the expected utility maximization  described 
above.  Denoting  the certainty-equivalent  level of the second-period  tariff by 
we can show that t and exp(T)  are related  in the following  manner: 
(11)  t  exp(T) + 
where  is a composite  term  involving  first- and second-order  derivatives  of 
the indirect utility  function,  and  has an indeterminate  sign (see Appendix). 
Since  the second  term  involves  the square of the second-period  rariif,  it is 
of second-order  importance  competed  to the first  term.6  In  vhst follows,  I 
will  generelly  ignore  it.  Notice  that, as expected,  t is linked  positively 
to TR and negatively  to ir. 
Completing the model now requires  description of the behavior  of 
alternative  governments  that  would find it profitable  to abort  the reform 
process.  The list  here  is  endless.  I confine myself  to a case which  is 
6.  The certainty-equivalent  tariff  is close, but not identical,  to the 
expected  value of the second-period  tariff, even  though  consumers  are assumed 
to be risk-averse  in income.  This follows from the fact that the indirect 
utility  function  is not linear in  prices. -15- 
fairly general  in  ita applicability.  Consider  a government  whose objectives 
are primarily  distributional:  to  redistribute  income to a favored  group in 
society from  a less-favored  group.7  Suppose further that  tariffs  are the sole 
means  of raising revenue for this purpose.  Than,  this  "rediscribucive" 
government  will  attempt  to  achieve  its distributional  aim at least cost to 
overall efficiency.  Letting  superscripts  denote  the two groups in  society, we 
could visualize  its objective  function  aa being the following: 
Max  W1  s.t.  ￿  W, 
t,T 
whara  — V(l+t,  5(l+T), y1) 
— V(l÷c,  &(l+T), 
yl  7iy  i—l,2,  .11 + 2 — 
Q  —  cc2  +  ETC2. 
V(.)  denotes an indirect  utility  function, and  is the shara of aach  of  tha 
two groups in total income before  redistribution.  We will treat individuals 
in  the two groups  as  being  identical  in  all raspecca but chair label,  and will 
assume  that intartemporal  demand  functions ara homothatic.  This  way, 
aggregate behavior--aggregate  levels of  consumption  and the discount  rate-  - 
will be independent  of income distribution. 
The "rediscributive"  government  arrives to  maximize  cha welfare  of  the 
first  group subject to a minimum  welfare  level for group 2.  Ic  does so  by 
7.  This is somewhat  reminiscent  of the framework considered  by Aleaina  (1987) 
in which  the existence  of  two political parties with different  crade-offa 
between  inflation  and  unemployment  is shown  to generate  a  business  cycle that 
accompanies  the political  cycla. -16- 
redistributing  all tariff  revenue to  the former  group; henre  group  1  receives 
in lump-sum  fashion the tariff  payments made by group 2 (Q) to  supplement  its 
income.  The higher  the level of tariff revenues,  the more redistribution  this 
government  can undertake.  The tariffs that solve the above problem will  be 
denoted by t  and  TR.  Notice  that  as long  as  the constraint V  continues 
to hind,  no time-inconsistency  problems  arise,  since once t is chosen  the only 
way of  guaranteeing  W to the second  group is by selecting  the level of T 
which  is optimal  etc ante.  But when  the constraint  does  not  hind,  the pre- 
cormitment and time-consistent  policy  paths  may diverge  (sac the next 
section)  ,g 
Consider  first the case where  foreign assistance  is non-existent  (B=C) 
Then, provided  that the constraint W1￿W  is not binding at t1=O,  the 
"redistributive"  government will choose to have  positive  levels of protection 
so as to benefit group  1.  What  will be the optimal  levels of the tariffs? 
Given  its objective  function, the "rediatributive"  government  has the 
incentive to transfer  income from  one group to the other at least cost in 
terms of efficiency.  This can be achieved  by setting  the tariff  rates  in  the 
two periods  equal to each  other,  i.e. tP_TR.  This allows  the economy  to 
remain  intertemporally  efficient.  Denote the common  level of the tariff  as 
t.  Since  t keeps  group  2 just  at , it must  be the case that 
E(l+t,  S*(l4t), Th —  (l÷)E(l, 8, ) 
8.  In this case, the maximization  problem of  the redistributive  government 
has to be stated  differently,  involving a two-stage  decision:  first maximire 
over T,  given  t;  secondly,  choose  t given  second-period  derision  rule  linking 
T to t. -17- 
12(f()  - i  + 6*F(k+*  )) 
where  the starred  variables  are fixed  at  the levels  that obtain  in  the absence 
of intertemporal  distortions  (i.e. when tT).  This allows us to derive an 
explicit expression  for the "optimal"  tariff: 
(12)  t — (72[f(.>  i  + 6*F(k+i*  .fl ÷ E(l,8*,w)) 
-  1. 
We could think  of  this as the pre-existing  level of the tariff before  the 
reformist  government  takes over. 
So far, the "redistributive"  government  and the "liberalizer"  would 
necessarily  reveal  themselves  by their choice of  trade policies  in the initial 
period:  the first  settles on  t—t, the second on t—O.  In  practice,  there will 
occasionally  be reasons for the "redistributive"  government  to act out of 
character.  In the context of  developing  countries,  this will be  typically  the 
case when  balance-of-payments  dIfficulties  force  the government  to seek the 
"green light" from  multilateral  organizations  such as the IMF or  the World 
Bank.  Obtaining  the requisite foreign  assistance  will  then  require a number 
of  reforms which  the government will undertake  to appease its foreign 
creditors,  but will not particularly  feel committed  to maintaining.  Indeed, 
once the foreign-exchange  constraint  is alleviated,  back-tracking  will  be the 
natural  temptation. 
9.  Witness  the recent  case of  Zambia, which  is described  in  the colorful 
prose  of  The Economist  as follows:  "Now  Mr Kaunda has told the IMF to get 
lost.  He  wants  to service no  debts, get  no new loans and  have  no new 
policies.  Instead he is imposing on  his people  a new,  tighter version  of the 
bad old policies  that led to the trouble in  the first place,  and whose  only-- 
bogus--merit  is that  they are nor imposed by  foreign bankers"  (May 9, 1987, p. 
13) In  the present  framework,  rhs foreign transfer B serves  to highlight  the 
problem.  I essume  thet the trensfer  is contingent  on  trede  reform  being 
osrried out in  the first period, with tariffs lowered to  zero.  In  the serond 
period, no additional  transfers  are made, and the government  can freely  chooee 
its policiesj°  Will the "redistributive"  government  reduce  teriffs  in  the 
first period?  If  B is large enough,  it clearly will.  Setting tO  has the 
coat of preventing  income redistribution  in  the first period.  But thia coat 
can  be more  than offaet by  the relaxation  of the overall budget  conatreint aa 
a consequence of the foreign transfer.  In fact, the transfer may  also allow 
the "redistributive"  government  to  impose  a higher  tariff  in.  the  od period 
thao it gould otherwise  have been able  to.  The  letter follows  from  the fact 
that  the relaxation of the overall budget constraint allows  the second group 
to be squeezed to a greater extent than before.  The next seotion provides 
more  detail on these issues. 
floolin&snbearsflnE2tl  ibr  i  a 
I will first consider the charaoteristica  of pooling and separating 
equilibria, and then  use these  to discuss how the government  can successfully 
signal its type and distinguish itself from  the "redistributive"  government. 
PonlinjibriW.  Consider  a pooling equilibrium  wherein  the two 
10.  The question  arises: why would  foreign lenders not extract  commitments 
for longer-term  reform?  The general answer  is that they  would  like to bun 
can't.  Once the domestic  crisis  is abated,  the need for multilateral  aid is 
reduced  and conditionality  becomes  inoperative.  This points  to an important 
dilemma:  the governments  that are the most deserving  of  assistance  from  the 
perspective  of the multilateral  institutions  are the .ioea thst  could be hurt 
by it  due to the induced credibility  problems. -19- 
types of government  both set first-petiod  ariffs  equal to zero,  and hence 
become  indistinguishable.  Foc this to be an equilibrium,  the "redistributive" 
govecnment  has to find  it preferabe to fotsake cedisttibutive  policies  in  the 
frrsc period.  Let the maximum-value  furction associated  witn this 
government's  optimization  ptohlem be  wtitten  as W(r,  T1.  In  the absene of 
pooling, t  will be non-zero,  and foreign  assistance  wil' not he forthcoming. 
Then  tR  c as discussed  shove,  in  a pooling equilibrium,  by contrsst, 
the "rediatribctive'  government  is or,straine.  to act ta—U, but can choe 
otherwise optir.ally.  As  sil  be shown  below,  mis optiasi level of TB sni 
depend  among  uthere,  or  B ur..  it be  written  as T  1R3, 
is  an  equilibrium when the tollusing  inequality holds: 
(13)  W1(O,  TR(B, z); B>O, ￿  W1(t  B—U;. 
it  ought  to be clear  that 1(U, TR(B,  m)) is an  increasing  function  of  B:  as 
the amount of foreign aid increases,  the intectemporal  budget  constraint  is 
relaxed,  and the potential  welfare of both  groups in  society rises.  Hence  the 
larger is  B, the greater the likelihood  that a pooling equilibrium  will 
result.  The borderline  level of  B, denoted  by 8mm,  is defined  implicitly by 
the relation  W'(U,  TR(Bmmn,  ); B_Bmin) — Wm, t; B—U). 
hat us suppose thmt the level of B indeed exceeds Bmin, so that the 
eronomy  is sturk  in a pooling equilibrium.  We can now characterize  this 
equilibrium  more fully.  We already know that t—U, and that t is linked  to 
TR via expression  (Il).  To determine TB in  turn, we hava to bear in mind  that 
the ex-ante and ex-poat levels of  second-period  consumption  (and hence  of -20- 
welfare)  will  differ  for each group.  That is because first-period  decisions 
are based  on  T, whereas  the actual  outturn will  be eithar  0 or T.  This 
affects the actual  redistribution  to take place  in  the second period,  and 
drives  a wedge  between  the ax-ante and ax-post  levels of  welfare  for each 
group. 
Consider  the situation  from the perspective  of the second  group.  Let 
6(t, B) be the function linking the discount  factor  to the (certainty- 
equivalent)  second-period  tariff  rate  and the foreign transfer  (see  secticn 
IT).  Distinguishing  anticipated  from actual  outcomes by using 
"S" with the 
former, and letting superscripts  distinguish  the two groups, we first have: 
(14)  E(l, 8(.)(l+t).  Q2)  72(f(.)  - i(5(.))  + B + SflF(k+i(5(.),.)3 
This ensures  that planned expenditures  are consistent  with  the present 
discounted  value  of resources available  to  the second  group.  However,  if in 
the second  period  the government  in  power  reveals itself  as the redistributive 
type, T is set at TR > t,  and this group's real income and consumption  fail. 
To  represent  the situation,  define  a restricted  expenditure  functicn  E(.) 
which yields  the minimum expenditure  level required to reach  a given  level cf 
welfare when first-period consumption  (c2) is pre-determinsd: 
(15)  E(l÷T, W°; c2) — mm  ((l+T)C2 st. TJ(c2,  C2) ￿  H2), 
C2 
where: 
(16)  2  - El(1,  5(J(1+t), 2) 
Then, second-period  equilibrium  requires -21- 
(17)  E(1+TR, W2; c2) — 
i.e.  that  consumption  expenditures be in  line with the higher-than-anticipated 
second-period  tariff,  Given  T, equations  j4),  (16), and (17) jointly 
determine  first-period  consumption  (c2), ex-ante welfare  (2), and ex-post 
welfare  (N2) for the second group.  An  analogous  act of  equations  ran be 
written  alao for tne first group. 
Notice  that a time conaister.t  path of policy  scold require that the 
constraint  N  '-  N  be  bind4ng  fcc the "rediatributive"  government  in 
equilibriom.  This  ia bacaue  the  snmond  group cau  a.ways cc  a.jucezed to the 
limit  in the second pertod- - once  afl  aa;inga  and  investment decisiona hate 
been made--without incurring any efficiency coats.  Hence,  the equations  aoove 
can be used  to  solve for  the optimal choice  of T.  To  do  so,  we  fix  W  at 
and let the three equations  determine T,  c2, and .  This  defines an 
implicit  function T  a). 
Of  particular  interest is the nature  of the linkage  bet-aeen  B and T  in 
such a pooling  equilibrium.  While  the algebra here gets messy,  the basic 
story  is clear.  An increase in B raises  real income  it. the economy both 
through  its direct  effect  and through the induced increase  in investment  'the 
latter  being at a sub-optimal  level  given  > 0).  That in turn  stimulates 
first-period  consumption,  and makes  room for a greater  squeeze of the less- 
favored  group  through a larger  tariff in  the second  period.  Hence  a larger 
amount  of foreign aid  will result in a greater  interteeporal  distortion. 
Foreign  sasiatance  therefore has two important hidden  coats in  terms  of 
the credibility  of the reform  process.  First and foremost,  it  aakea  a pooling 
equilibrium more likely, and increases  the probsbility  that a genuinely -22- 
reform-minded  government will be confused with  one whose  motives  are 
ambiguous.  Secondly,  by relaxing  the economy-wide budget  constraint,  it 
permits  a larger redistributive  role  for a government  so inclined,  and a  more 
generous application  of  distorting  policies  to that end. 
Notice, however,  that the "redistributive"  government  pictured  here also 
cares about  efficiency.  This sets a natural limit to how far it would  like  to 
pursue an intertemporal  wedge.  In  particular,  it is possible  that for 
sufficiently high levels of T, further increases in B  will be  welfare- 
reducing  for this government,  as the added costs  of the intertemporal 
distortion  (since TR is increasing  in  B) may be  severe  enough.  In such a 
case, it would  prefer  to allow  the constraint  on  P2 not to bind.  But this 
would  require an  ability  to pre-cormit  to a level of  the second-period  tariff 
which  is lower  than that required  by time consistency.  Short  of such  pre- 
commitments,  the redistributive  government  will  always be tempted  to tax the 
second group  to the maximum  extent, as there are no efficiency  costs  of  doing 
so once the second period  starts. 
Sezarating  equilibrium.  Let us now turn  to pgan  equilibria.  In 
such  equilibria  the "liberalizing"  government will  not face  a credibility 
problem.  It is clear  from  the above  discussion  that this will  be the case 
whenever  B < gmmn  The  more interesting  questions  arise when  B ￿  Bmln,  yet 
the "liberalizing"  government  can successfully signal  its type in  order  to 
achieve  separation.  How can it do  so, and  will it went to? 
In  general, governments will have a multitude  of  signals available  to 
them.  But the better  signals are the ones that can communicate  the desired 
message  moat  directly.  In  the present framework,  the most  direct  signal  of 
the government's  future  intentions  is the first-period  tariff  itself.  The -23- 
appropriate  signal can be communicated  by implementing a negative  tariff, or 
an import  aubaidy.  (A  poaitive  tariff would clearly not do the job since it 
makes  the "rediatributive"  government  oniy keener  to imitate.)  Such  a signal 
conveys  irpoctant  information  to tha public  since an import subsidy  increases 
the cost to the "rediatrihutive"  government  of  mimicking  the "liberalizer" 
And the "libecaliring"  government  can profitably  aend  aoch a signal, even 
though  the subsidy policy  a going  to be coatla  to it too. 
To ace thea' points, it ía uaetol to  detecz.ine  ficat  tne costa of an 
import  subsidy  to the "radiatcibotive'  government.  Baaed on this, we  can  then 
argue  that with a sufficiently  arge first-period subsidy,  pooling will no 
longer  remaIn  an  equilibrium.  Finaily, we can check  to see whether  this 
signaling  strategy is a profitable  one for the  'liberalizing" government. 
To start with, conaidec  the effect  of a first-period  subsidy  on  the 
"redistributive"  govecnment'a  welfare.  The aubaidy makes  the relative price 
of second-period  conaumption even  higher,  i.e.  it reduces the consumption  rate 
of interest  further,  in addition, wth the aubaidy in  place,  the resources 
available  to the government  for rediacributive  purpoaea will  be lower:  some of 
the second-period  tariff  revenue now goes to  subsidize  the first-period 
consumption  of the lees-favored  group, and cannot be used to transfer  income 
to the favored group.  To offset  this, the government  may want  to raise T 
further,  but at the margin  the coat of  doing this  haa increased  as well:  the 
aubsidy exacerbates  the intertemporal  distortion,  and on  this account makes  a 
jgg  TR preferable.  Hence  the "rediatributive"  government  is caught  in a 
bind,  which  will be reflected  in a lower  level of  welfare for the favored 
group 
- 
Notice that  the ex-ante  and ex-post  levels of  welfare will  move in  the -24- 
same  direction  in  response  to the imposition  of  a first-period  subsidy.  This 
is because  the amount by which the ex-post and ex-  ante tedistributions  differ 
is unaffected.  We can therefore safely  confine the analysis  to  ex-ante 
welfare.  In  analogous  fashion to equation  (14),  the anticipated  level of 
welfare  for the first group ()  can  be implicitly  defined by  the following 
expression: 
(18)  E(l-s,  8(l+t), Q1) 
-  i(S)  + B  + SF(k+i(8),j)  + [-so + STCJ, 
where  s is the rate of  subsidy and  8  is once  again a function of the exogenous 
variables.  This makes  cleat that  first-period  subsidy payments  subtract 
directly  ftom  the income transfer made  available  to the first group.  To see 
the effects of s  on &, we  can  differentiate  this  expression  while  holding 
(and  hence  t) constant. 
(19)  EWdQ1  -c2ds + [tC2d8 
-  ado2 +  StdC2]  +  f-sdc1  + 8td01J. 
Notice  that, since only  relative prioes matter,  changes in  a and t have 
qualitatively  similar effects on  endogenous  variables.  Therefore  an  increase 
in  a reduces the consumption  rate of  interest and lowers 8, as we already know 
from  aection II that  dq/dt > 0  and  d8/dt  < 0.  Without  further algebra, 
then, the effects on  can  be easily deduced. 
The first  term  of (19) captures  the direct  effect of s on the income 
transfer  to the first group.  and is negative.  The terms  in the first braoket 
are the distributional  effects induced by intertemporal  substitution.  These 
amount  to a loss for the first group as well since:  (a) the subsidy  re- 
allocates  the second  group's consumption from  the seoood period  (in which it -25- 
is taxed) to the first period  (in which  it is subsidized) ,  end  hence  narrows 
the base for the income  transfer between  the groups; and (b)  &  fells  (as d&/ds 
< 0) thereby  reducing  the present  discounted  value  of  the redistribution. 
Finally,  the terms in  the second bracket cepture  the share  of the first group 
in  the overall efficiency  iosea  borne  by  the economy  as a consequence  of the 
exacerhation  of the intertempor'l distortion. 
Hence  the first-period  subsidy i,a both listributional and efficiency 
costs  fot the "radistributiva"  govetnuent.  Notice  that adjting  T  will not 
make the problem  go away  entirely,  sInce while  this can reduce  the 
intertemporal  distortion  it can never make up for the inrome  rratsfer lost 
through the subsidy.  Effectively,  the subsidy worsens  the trade-off between 
efficiency  and distrihution  for thia guvernnent.  Its valce  aa a signal of  the 
reformist  government's  intentions resides precisely  in  thIs fact. 
The fact that the first-period  subsidy  increaaea  the coat to the 
"redistributive"  government  of imitating the  Liberalizer"  implies that 
pooling  wiLl no Longer be an  equilibrium  for a sufficiently  high level of  s. 
Denote  by a*  the minimum  level of the subsidy needed  to achieve separation. 
This level  is implicitly  defined by  the following  equality; 
(20)  Wl(a*, TR(a*,  B,  ); B>0)  W1(E, E; B—0). 
where  W1(.)  is onte  again  the maximum-value  function for the "rediatributive" 
government.  Past a certain  level s, thia government will prefer  to give up 
the foreign aid B and will  revert  to its aeparating  strategy  of impoaing  a 
uniform  tariff  in  both  periods. 
When  will the "liberalizing"  government  signal?  The queation now  becomea 
whether  the "liberalizing"  government will find  it in its interest  to aeparate -25- 
via signaling  in this fashion.  The answer has to he  asibiguous in  general 
since signaling  is costly:  it imposes efficiency  costs on this government  as 
well.  In  the present  framework,  such  costs could be avoided in  principle  hy 
subsidizing  imports in  the aecond  period also.  This  way,  the intertemporal 
distortions  induced by the first-period  subsidy could be eliminated  (or,  more 
generally,  reduced).  But the problem with  this strategy  is that it is  tire- 
inconsistent.  Once  the aecond  period  comes around, the "liberalizing" 
government  will no longer have the incentive to implement  the aubsidy, as it 
generally  prefers  to avoid  trade distortions,  and the private  sector will  have 
already irrevocably  allocated  its consumption  intertemporally.  This in turn 
implies that  the "promise" of a second-period  subsidy will  not be  credible, 
and hence will  not yield  the desired pattern of  intertemporal  substitution. 
Oiven  that  the "liberalizer"  cannot avoid  the costs  of  signsling,  how far 
will it be able  to go?  Notice  that the marginal  efficiency  coat of  the first- 
period  subsidy is jpgr  for this government than it is for the redistriburive 
government, provided  separation  is achieved.  The reason  is simple.  Once the 
signal  is communicated,  the expected second-period  tariff  falls  to zero, and 
the welfare coat  of the first-period  subsidy is therefore  lowered.  In effect, 
s "small" enough subsidy, which is successful  in separating  the two 
governments,  will  lead  to only second-order welfare  losses  to the reformist 
government.  Since the reduction  in the intertemporsl  distortion  achieved by 
credibility  is a source of  first-order  welfare gain,  the balance will  be in 
favor of  stgnalrng whenever  a  is small enough.  In  other words,  crediole 
reform will  have  a hiss towards overshooting  its target. 
More can be said.  To the reformist government,  the cost incurred by lack 
of  credibility  is proportional  to the distortion  in  the consumption  rate  of -27- 
interest caused  by it (see section II)  .  A  credible  signal  via the subsidy 
creates  an  equivalent  distortion  in  the consumption race of interest  in  the 
same direction.  Now  the  government will clearly  pursue the  second  strategy 
provided  it is the lesser of the two evils.11  Denote by 5max the rate of  the 
subsidy  thet causes  a level of  distortion  identical to any given t(B, it), 
This level  is defined  implicitly by 
(21)  &/(ism5X) — 8[l+t(B, 
This expression equates  the  consumption  rate  of interest resulting from  a 
first-period subsidy  (end no  credibility  problem)  with  that  emerging  in  s 
pooling  equilibrium  (with no  subsidy).  Or 
(22)  max  t(j/il + 
This  cells us  the maximum rote of subsidization the "liberalizing"  government 
is willing  to undertake, provided separation is thereby  achieved.  (Notice 
that the subsidy has been defined  throughout in specific  rather  than ad- 
valorem rerms.  In the latter case, 5m3u would be  defined  simply by 5msx  — 
t.) 
Whether  the signal will be  employed end  a separating equilibrium will 
result can  now  be  easily determined.  The  answer depends  on the relationship 
between  and 5m,  As  long ss  5m5i >  ic will pay to  signal,  and the 
11.  This abstracts from  additional problems chat can be created by  the 
subsidy.  Typically, governments  will be  revenue-constrained  in the sense chat 
additional  caxes can be collected only at high cosc.  This  will  make  the 
"liberalizing"  government  look  more  like  the "rediscributive" one:  it will 
make  the  former more hesitant to  employ policies  which lead to reduccions  in 
available revenue. -28- 
reformist  government  will  select  a  =  s.  When  5max  <  effective  signaling 
will  be too costly,  and the government  will resign  itself  to living  with the 
credibility problem  and choose  s  =  In the unlikely  case that 5m 
the government  will  be indifferent  between the two strategies. 
Finelly,  consider whether  the "liberalizing"  government  would  be willing 
to ask its foreign creditors  to curtail their assistance  so as to reduce  the 
incentive of the "redistributive"  government  to  mimic.  Provided  is small 
enough, this will  not be a profitable  strategy since  the income  losses  due to 
reductions  in  B will  be first-order and large relstive  to the costs  of 
incressing  s.  But  with large s' (i.e. costly  signaling)  there will  exist  a 
tradeoff st the mergin  between  B and s. 
)/.  Concluding Remagks 
The purpose  of this  paper was to  mske  precise  an  intuition  that  is 
commonly shared:  the credibility  of policy  reform  is intimately  linked  to the 
pace at  which it is introduced  and  carried out.  The argument  offered here is 
thst  policy  overshooting  may have the consequence of  distinguishing  a 
genuinely  reform-minded  government  from its more equivocal  counterparts.  That 
in turn  has the effect of  rendering  the reform process more credible  than it 
would  otherwise  have been, alleviating many  problems  introduced  by the 
credibility  gap.  To be  sure,  the speed of reform  is not the only  signal  that 
will generally be aveilable  to  policy-makers.13  But such  a signal has the 
12.  Tn this case,  the intertemoral distortion  could be severe enough  for the 
goveroment  to be willing  to forsske B  and set t > 0. 
13.  In  a recent  paper,  for exsmple, Persson and  van Wijnbergen  (1987) examine -29- 
advantage  that its measage  is carried within  the policy  itself, and hence  is 
relatively  easily  decoded by its recipients.  Other,  less direct  signals will 
often  require that the publi.  disentangle  corplic.ted  general-equilibrium 
relationships. 
While  many  of  the  connlusin',s  drawn  in  the preceding  sections are 
specific  to  the model analysed,  the basic argument  is a robust one.  At  the 
outset  of snv reform,  the publit will typilallr he unable  to fathom the trae 
motivations  nf the government  undertaking  the refnrn  Since  the distorting 
policies  in  question have  been  put in place by thuse in  puwer  to begin  with, 
what reason  is there to  believe  that the authnrities now 'see tne light"? 
The confusion  becomes worse  when, ss is often  the case, the policy  freedom of 
the government  is temporarily  restricted  as a consequence of a crisis  whose 
resolution  requires  the cooperstion  of actors  in favor of  reform.  In  the 
present model, such  a situation was created by the availability  of foreign 
assistance  contingent  on  trade  reform.  gut ctearly such instances are more 
general.  For lack of  alternatives,  a temporary  .risis will frequently  require 
incoherent  and ill-intentioned  policy-makers  to ant  (temporarily) just lIke 
coherent and  well-intentioned  ones.  Signaling via policy-overshooting  tan 
then  help reduce  the confusion. 
With respect to trade  reform proper,  the conclusions  of  the present paper 
run against much  conventional  wisdom  regarding the advantages  of  gradualism. 
While  I have  not considered  any of the usual justifications  for gradualism,14 
the possibility  that wage-price  controls may act as a signal of a 
disinflationary  government's  intentions, 
14.  For arguments  in  favor of gradualism,  see Edwards  and van  Wijnbergen -30- 
the credibility  argument made  here  serves  to qualify  the usual arguments  made 
in that  context.  In  practice,  the nature of  the tradeoff between  these 
possibly  conflicting  considerations  will depend  on  the importance  of  the 
credibility  gap.  The more  severe  are the credibility problem  and its 
consequences,  the more  likely  it is thst a sharp break  with the past will be 
viewed  as attractive. 
(1986) and Rodrik  (1987) -31- 
APPENDIX 
This sppendix derives the certainty-equivalent  tsriff  expressed  in 
equstion  (Il).  Let p snd P denote  the prices  for the two periods.  P is :-,e 
second-period  prire--a random  vsrishle  under our sssursptions.  P is its 
certainty-equivalent.  The genersl problem is to  find ths  level of P  that is 
implicitiy  defined by the following  expression: 
(Al)  V(p, P,  1)  EV(p,  P.  I) 
where VC)  and NV; ..  stand  for the indirect utility function  and its expected 
velue,  end I is income.  Notice  that income  is non-random,  as it is completely 
determined  once first-period  choices  are made  If consumers  are risk-neutral 
in  income, we can write 
(A2)  V(p, P,  I)  v(p,  P)l, 
hence  (Al)  becomes: 
(Al')  v(p, P) - Ev(p,  P). 
Now  we epproximete both sides of the equality by a second-order  Taylor 
expansion  around  (p.  P),  where  P denotes the expected value  (average) of the 
second-period  price. 
w(p,  P) - w(p,  P) + v2(P-P)  + 
Therefore, -32- 
(A3)  Ev(p,  P) —  v(p, )  +  v22)o2, 
where c2 is the variance  of the aerond-period  price.  Notice  that all partial 
derivativea  of  v(.)  are evaluated  at (p,  P).  In  turn, 
(A4)  v(p, ?)  v(p,  P)  v2(P-P) + 
The laat term  can  he ignored here  as it will  he of the order  Setting  (A3) 
and (A4)  equal  to each other, we can solve for ?: 
(A5)  =  +  (l/2v2)(v,2 + v22)a2. 
Since  o2 = var(P)  exp(P2) 
-  fexp(P)]2,  it is straightforward  to show thor 
(A6)  o2 = r(la)fSTh2. 
Denoting  (l/2v2)(v12  v22) and substituting  (A6) into  (AS)  yields 
equation  (11) in  the text. 
While  cannot  be signed  in general, the interested  reader  can verify 
that (when P > p) a sufficient  condition  for  to be  negative  is for 
consumers  to prefer  price  stabilization  to price  variability,  i.e.  for v(.) to 
be  concave. -33- 
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